Alliance for Youth Justice (AYJ) Response to the Law Society Homicide Offences Review
The AYJ is an alliance of over 70 non-profit organisations, advocating for and with children to drive positive change in youth justice in England and Wales. Bringing together large national charities, advocacy groups, and grassroots community organisations, our strength lies in the frontline expertise of our network and the lived experiences of the children they support. We work to transform society's response to children in, or at risk of contact with, the justice system treating this contact as a symptom of unmet need and systemic failure. Our mission is to champion a child-centred, rights-based, and trauma-informed response, striving for a system that prioritises healing and support over criminalisation so that every child has the opportunity to thrive
The AYJ’s response focuses on Homicide related offences as they apply to children under the age of 18. We have limited our response to the questions where our members knowledge and expertise can best contribute.
A Distinct Approach for Children
AYJ strongly supports a distinct, child-specific approach to homicide offences. Children’s developmental stage, rights under the UNCRC, and the statutory aims of the youth justice system require a framework that recognises reduced culpability, prioritises rehabilitation, and ensures custody is used only as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period (UNCRC Article 37).
Contemporary developmental science demonstrates that children have reduced capacity for planning, self-control and risk appraisal, heightened susceptibility to peer influence and coercion, and increased neuroplasticity that supports positive change.1 A homicide framework that treats children as miniature adults is incompatible with this evidence and risks entrenching injustice.
Life Sentences for Children
AYJ does not support life sentences for children under any circumstances and endorses maintaining the prohibition on whole-life orders for under-18s. Life imprisonment, and in particular, the mandatory life sentence, is fundamentally incompatible with children’s rights, child development science, and the Child First principles that underpin the youth justice system. International standards are clear: UNCRC Article 37 prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility of release for children and requires that deprivation of liberty be a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period. Even where children may later be released, lifelong licence and supervision mean the law treats them as never fully rehabilitated, which conflicts with rights-based priorities of rehabilitation and reintegration.
England and Wales as Extreme Outliers
In addition England and Wales are outliers in Western Europe and most commonwealth jurisdictions in retaining the mandatory life sentence for people who are convicted of
committing murder as a child.15 European jurisdictions generally prohibit, or otherwise place substantial limits on, the use of life sentences (either mandatory or discretionary) for individuals under the age of 18. A report by a children’s rights organisation in 2015 found that of the 28 European countries considered (including the UK), 22 had explicitly prohibited life imprisonment for children, or placed a clear limit on the period of detention which falls short of life imprisonment.2
Fair Labelling and the Use of “Murder”
AYJ supports distinguishing between intent to kill and intent to cause serious harm. However, we do not support the use of the term “murder” for children in Tier 2.
Labelling children “murderers” when they did not intend to kill is disproportionate, stigmatising and harmful to desistance. Children often do not understand why they have been labelled murderers when they did not intend to kill, undermining legitimacy and rehabilitation.
International practice supports this approach: the Scottish Law Commission recommends reserving “murder” for the gravest conduct because of the permanent stigma attached. For children, fair labelling requires terminology that reflects reduced culpability and developmental immaturity.
AYJ therefore recommends that Tier 2 for children should use alternative labels such as “culpable homicide” or “unlawful killing”.
Q1. We provisionally propose that the structure of the general homicide offences should have three tiers, to reflect different levels of culpability. Do consultees agree?
Yes. AYJ supports a three-tier structure.
A tiered structure for homicide offences would better support compliance with UNCRC Article 37, which requires that custody for children be used only as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period. By limiting the circumstances in which the mandatory life sentence applies, a tiered model brings more children into a sentencing framework that gives courts greater flexibility to impose child-specific sentences. This would enable judges to take account of a child’s welfare, developmental needs and prospects for rehabilitation when deciding the appropriate sentence, and would create clearer scope for considering whether a child can be safely managed in the community.
Limiting the applicability of mandatory life in cases that do not involve an intent to kill therefore goes some way to aligning sentencing practice with the Sentencing Council’s Children Guideline and the Child First framework, and better protects rights-based priorities of rehabilitation and reintegration.
Q2. We provisionally propose that there should be an offence of first-degree murder where the defendant unlawfully killed another person with the intention to kill. Do consultees agree?
AYJ supports a strict, narrowing down of the definition of first-degree murder limited to cases of intent to kill. However, for children, the law should afford greater flexibility to enable factors such as maturity, trauma, coercion, peer influence and neurodiversity when assessing a child’s awareness when a child is charged with a homicide offence. These factors affect culpability and risk appraisal. Distinguishing between intent to kill and intent to cause serious harm would improve fair labelling for some children: it would ensure only those with the highest level of culpability face the top tier of homicide liability and reduce the chance that children with reduced capacity are placed in the most severe sentencing category. However, so long as the mandatory life sentence is retained for children convicted of Tier 1 murder, unjust outcomes are likely to follow. Consideration should be given to excluding children from Tier 1.
Q3. We provisionally propose that there should be an offence of second-degree murder where the defendant unlawfully killed another person with the intention to cause serious injury. This offence would have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (discretionary life sentence). Do consultees agree?
Yes, AYJ supports the creation of a second-degree homicide category for cases where intent falls short of first-degree murder. A tiered structure enables more proportionate sentencing and should support child-appropriate disposals. However, it questions whether it is appropriate that children with a lower culpability should be convicted of murder rather than a term that better reflects their culpability.
However, AYJ is clear that children should not be subject to life sentences or under any tier whether mandatory or discretionary. Our opposition to life sentences is grounded in UNCRC Article 37, which requires that custody be used only as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period; a life sentence is structurally incompatible with that requirement because it imposes an indeterminate and potentially very long period of detention. Lifelong licence and supervision mean the law treats them as never fully rehabilitated, which conflicts with rights-based priorities of rehabilitation and reintegration.
A tiered homicide structure strengthens compliance with these obligations. By narrowing the scope of the most serious offence and ensuring that only cases involving clear intent to kill fall within the highest tier, the model reduces children’s exposure to mandatory life sentences and long tariffs. A second-degree category allows courts to impose serious but determinate sentences that reflect differences in intent and reduced culpability, and that prioritise rehabilitation, development and reintegration in line with the UNCRC.
Q4. We provisionally propose that when the defendant is charged with first-degree murder and a partial defence is successful, the defendant should be convicted of “murder with a partial defence” in the second tier of the homicide structure, for which the maximum sentence would be life imprisonment (discretionary life sentence).
AYJ agrees that where a partial defence is successful, the conviction should fall within a lower tier of homicide liability. For children, this approach is essential to reflect reduced culpability. However, AYJ does not support life sentences for children under any tier. If partial defences move a child into the second tier, that tier must allow for serious but determinate sentences that recognise the difference in intent and support compliance with UNCRC Articles 37 and 40, which require custody to be a last resort, for the shortest appropriate period, and focused on rehabilitation and reintegration
Q10 We provisionally propose that there should be a separate category of reckless manslaughter which applies where:
The defendant’s conduct caused the death of another.
The defendant was aware of a risk that their conduct would cause death or serious injury.
It was unreasonable for the defendant to take that risk, having regard to the circumstances as they knew or believed them to be.
Do consultees agree?
Yes but only with strict child-specific safeguards.
AYJ supports defining reckless manslaughter on a subjective basis for children, meaning the prosecution must prove that the child recognised and consciously disregarded a serious risk of death. This is essential to avoid holding children to adult standards of risk appreciation and to ensure proportionality, given children’s developmental immaturity and heightened susceptibility to coercion, peer influence and exploitation.
Any offence of reckless manslaughter must include explicit child-specific safeguards, including mandatory consideration of maturity, neurodiversity, trauma, intoxication, coercion and exploitation when assessing subjective recklessness. These safeguards are necessary to prevent children being unfairly drawn into higher-tier homicide categories.
The creation of a separate category of reckless manslaughter must not increase children’s exposure to more serious homicide offences or longer sentences. For children, sentencing must remain child-centred, determinate and rehabilitative, consistent with UNCRC principles that custody is a last resort and for the shortest time necessary.
AYJ would not support any model that:
expands children’s exposure to higher-tier homicide offences
increases sentence lengths
relies on objective or constructive fault
ignores immaturity, neurodiversity, coercion or exploitation
So the definition is acceptable only if it is used to limit liability for children, not expand it.
Q19. Under our proposals, a defendant who unlawfully kills another person with the intention to cause serious injury would be guilty of second-degree murder. Currently, where the defendant acts with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm and takes steps that are more than merely preparatory towards doing so, the defendant may be guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent or attempting to cause grievous bodily harm. We provisionally propose that this approach be retained, with the consequence that there would not be an offence of attempted second-degree murder.
Do consultees agree?
AYJ agrees with the proposal. We support retaining the current approach, under which intention to cause serious injury gives rise to offences such as causing grievous bodily harm with intent or attempting to cause grievous bodily harm, rather than creating a new offence of attempted second-degree murder. This avoids expanding the homicide framework in a way that could expose children to an additional, higher-tier offence and more severe sentencing consequences.
Q22. We invite consultees to tell us if they believe or have evidence or data to suggest that the homicide offences, or our proposed reforms, could result in advantages or disadvantages to certain groups or based on certain characteristics, with particular attention to the protected characteristics in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 (age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation), and also other characteristics such as socio-economic position and immigration status
The provisional equality impact assessment (EqIA) is insufficient and must be substantially revised. It fails to adequately assess racial disproportionality, the impact of joint enterprise, and the specific ways in which children’s vulnerabilities (care experience, trauma, neurodiversity) interact with homicide law and sentencing.
Transferred fault can convert low-culpability participation into high-culpability offences; for children these risks breaching proportionality and fair labelling under UNCRC obligations. Children’s developmental immaturity and susceptibility to coercion mean that doctrines which transfer intent or fault from one actor to another are particularly dangerous when applied to under-18s
The State has obligations under the UNCRC to assess and mitigate discriminatory impacts on children. Therefore, a Child Rights Impact Assessment (CRIA) that tests each proposal against Articles 37 and 40 and the Child First principles (reintegration, proportionality, custody as last resort) and the Child First Principles should be carried out in addition to a EqIA.
Conclusion
AYJ urges the Law Society to ensure that homicide reform does not entrench England and Wales’ position as an international outlier. A child-specific approach is essential to uphold children’s rights, reflect developmental science, address disproportionality, and ensure fair labelling. Children must be excluded from Tier 1, protected from life sentences under any tier, and supported through a sentencing framework that prioritises rehabilitation and reintegration.
Lisa Dhanjal
Interim Policy Manger, AYJ
September 2026
1 Sarah-Jayne Blakemore (2026), The developing adolescent brain: Implications for youth justice and children in criminal proceedings, Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, Volume 81, Available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2026.101807.
2 Child Rights International Network (2015), “Life Imprisonment of Children in the European Union” (2015b). Available at: https://archive.crin.org/sites/default/files/life_in_the_eu3.pdf. 17 https://archive.crin.org/en/library/news-archive/france-life-imprisonment-sentences-children abolished.html